









The epistle to Cangrande, purportedly written by Dante towards the end of his life as 
a commentary on his poem, classifies the Commedia as ‘a work of ethics’: its purpose 
is to lead people from the misery of sin and to direct them to the beatitude of Heaven 
(XIII, 15–16). In the poem itself, Beatrice commands Dante-character to write ‘for 
the good of the world which lives badly’ (in pro del mondo che mal vive; Purg. 
XXXII, 103). The Commedia is thus ‘vital nourishment’ (vital nodrimento; Par. 
XVII, 131) because, by depicting the state of souls in the three realms of the medieval 
Christian afterlife, it shows how a person – through the use of free will – may merit 
eternal happiness in Paradise, eternal damnation in Hell, or require temporary 
expiation for sin in Purgatory (Ep. XIII, 11). Dante projects these three realms onto 
the contemporary geocentric world view (the earth as the centre of the cosmos), 
creatively joining his original moral vision to the macro-history of salvation. Dante 
imagines that when Satan fell from Heaven, the earth in the northern hemisphere 
recoiled in horror, creating the spiralling funnel of Hell. This displaced mass of earth 
then formed the conical mountain of Purgatory in the southern hemisphere, 
humanity’s way back to God. As the pilgrim descends into Hell, he encounters 
increasingly grave human evils until he reaches Satan at the earth’s exact centre. As 
he ascends the mountain of Purgatory, he gets ever closer to God and ever further 
from Satan: the sins he encounters thus decrease in gravity. Likewise, as he ascends 
through the nine heavenly spheres on his way to the Empyrean, he encounters blessed 
souls characterized by ever greater virtues and ever greater holiness. In short, the 
poem follows the simple, moral-geographical law that to rise up is good, to sink 
down is bad.   
 However, Dante’s moral vision is especially innovative for its detailed and 
systematic ordering of saints and sinners. At a fundamental level, the number 
symbolism of three (the Trinity) and nine (creation) underpins the poem’s moral 
structure. There are nine circles of Hell and, with the notable exceptions of circles 
one and six, there are three main categories of evil: incontinence (circles 2–5), 
violence (circle 7), and fraud (circles 8–9). There are nine principal areas of 
Purgatory: the seven terraces that purify the seven capital vices (pride, envy, wrath, 
sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust) are framed by the two regions of Ante-Purgatory 
and the Earthly Paradise. And there are nine heavens of Paradise, governed by the 
nine orders of angels. Although the moral structure is less explicit in Paradise, Dante 
does seem to allude to the three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) and the 
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four cardinal virtues (prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance) in the first seven 
planetary spheres. Furthermore, Dante-character is examined on the three theological 
virtues in the eighth heaven of the Fixed Stars. 
 Topographical markers are further delineators of moral structure. These are 
particularly clear in Purgatory (the seven terraces of the mountain) and in Paradise 
(the planetary heavens). The moral structure of Hell, however, is particularly 
complex. Dante divides up its multiple regions and sub-regions through a variety of 
topographical elements, drawing upon a range of sources from classical texts, such as 
Virgil’s Aeneid and Statius’s Thebaid, to Christian voyage and vision literature and 
preaching manuals. Upper Hell (circles 1–5) is entered through a gateway; Lower 
Hell (circles 6–9) is within the city of Dis. A steep cliff divides the sins of violence 
(circle 7) from the ten ‘evil ditches’ (Malebolge) of simple fraud (circle 8), while a 
central well sets apart the treacherous (circle 9). Differing landscapes are used to 
subdivide regions: thus, a bloody river, a thorny wood, and a fiery desert segment the 
seventh circle of violence into violence against another, against self, and against God. 
Dante draws especially on Virgil’s depiction of the pagan underworld in Aeneid VI, 
transforming this material in ingenious ways. He borrows four rivers to mark off 
groups of sinners: Acheron divides the ‘neutrals’ from the rest of the damned sinners 
(Inf. III); Styx contains the wrathful and the sullen (VII), Phlegethon the violent 
against others (XII), the icy lake of Cocytus the treacherous (XXXI). Similarly, Dante 
transforms mythological monsters to describe or nuance moral structure. For 
example, Dante gives Virgil’s infernal judge Minos a monstrous tail that he 
grotesquely wraps around himself one to nine times depending on the circle of Hell 
allotted to a sinner’s damnation (V, 4–12). 
 How original, then, is Dante’s moral system, and what might it indicate about 
his wider political and theological outlook? What criteria does he employ to judge 
that some sins are worse than others, and conversely that some goods are more 
valuable than others? How, moreover, does Dante represent the moral structure of his 
afterlife in the poem? After all, Dante could have started his poem with a ‘table of 
contents’ outlining the moral structure of each of the three canticles. But he chose not 
to, deliberately withholding the kind of bird’s eye view provided by later 
commentators, especially in the Renaissance, and by introductory visual diagrams in 
modern editions of the poem. It is only a third of the way through Hell (XI), half way 
through Purgatory (XVII), and two thirds of the way through Paradise (XXII) that we 
find a gloss on the regions’ moral structures. We should be sensitive, therefore, to the 
way in which Dante progressively builds a moral structure into his poem and to its 





One of many interpretations of the three beasts that Dante-character encounters at the 
beginning of his journey – the leopard, the lion, and the she-wolf (Inf. I, 31–60) – is 
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that they represent the basic tripartite moral structure of Dante’s Hell: incontinence, 
violence, and fraud. However, such symbolism is allusive at best, and the actual 
moral classification of sins occurs only after Dante-character has entered the city of 
Dis. Without the benefit of scholarly diagrams and maps, the first readers of Dante’s 
poem would have been initially disorientated as surprise builds upon surprise: the 
pilgrim’s first moral guide is not an authoritative Christian saint but the pagan poet 
Virgil; the first group of sinners encountered, the ‘neutrals’, are unknown to medieval 
theology and entirely Dante’s own invention (III, 21–69); the first circle of Hell, 
Limbo, is radically revised by Dante to include virtuous pagans. Given that the 
second circle is devoted to lust, the third to gluttony, the fourth to avarice and 
prodigality, and the fifth to wrath, the reader might naturally suppose that the seven 
deadly sins (or capital vices) is an ordering principle. But Dante sets up this 
expectation only to frustrate it for the system of the seven deadly sins then decisively 
breaks down. Although sloth may be implicitly condemned as a counterpart to wrath 
(VII, 115–26), there is no circle dedicated to either envy or pride despite these two 
remaining deadly sins being referenced alongside avarice, in Inferno VI, 74. 
Boccaccio first claimed that the opening of Inferno VIII – ‘Continuing, I have to tell’ 
(Io dico seguitando) – represents Dante’s return to writing after a decisive break, and 
some critics suggest that Dante changed his mind about the moral structure of Hell in 
the process of writing. It has been argued, for example, that Dante originally intended 
to embody envy in Cavalcante dei Cavalcanti and pride in Farinata, and only later 
salvaged the material in his masterly creation of the tenth canto of the Epicureans. 
Dante, of course, ultimately deploys the scheme of the seven vices to structure 
Purgatory. Whether or not he originally intended the scheme for Upper Hell, its 
suggestion remains strong, providing interesting points of parallel and contrast with 
its later development in the second canticle.  
 The delayed classification of moral evil is presented when the pilgrim and 
Virgil are unable to descend further because of the horrible stench cast up by the 
abyss of Lower Hell. They are forced to wait while they become accustomed to it and 
Virgil makes the time profitable by finally explaining Hell’s moral structure (XI, 16–
66). There is a threefold distinction: first, between incontinence (Upper Hell) and 
malice (Lower Hell); second, between malice through violence (circle 7) and malice 
through fraud (circles 8 and 9); and third, between simple fraud like counterfeiting, 
which deceives a stranger who has no particular reason to trust us (circle 8), and 
treacherous fraud like betraying one’s own father, which deceives someone who has a 
special reason to trust us, and thus breaks a special bond of love (circle 9). Many 
scholars have posited an inconsistency in Virgil’s rationale that apparently derives 
from Dante’s fusion of two sources. Where Cicero’s De officiis, I, 13 subdivides 
malice into violence and fraud (XI, 22–4), Aristotle’s Ethics, VI, 1–6 distinguishes 
between incontinence, malice, and mad bestiality (79–84). However, Virgil’s 
rationale is arguably consistent. On such an interpretation, the Ciceronian and 
Aristotelian usages of the term ‘malice’ (22 and 82) both map onto the region of 
Lower Hell as a whole; the Ciceronian subdivision between ‘violence and fraud’ 
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differentiates circles seven and eight; the Aristotelian ‘mad bestiality’ serves as a 
subcategory of the genus ‘malice’ to indicate extreme cruelty, thereby differentiating 
circles eight and nine. In this way, Virgil’s rationale effectively demarcates the four 
main regions of Hell: the four circles of incontinence; the three ‘rings’ (gironi) of 
violence; the ten concentric ‘pouches’ (Malebolge) of simple fraud; and the pit of 
Cocytus consisting of four sub-circles of treacherous fraud.  
 The circles of incontinence follow the principle of ‘counter-punishment’ 
(contrapasso; Inf. XXVIII, 142) explicitly referenced by the Occitan poet Bertran de 
Born, according to which infernal suffering reflects the nature of the sin being 
punished. For Dante, human beings are rational animals: as incontinent sinners 
subject their reason to their desire (they know what the right moral action is but, 
despite this, do evil because of an overwhelming passion), they become – in act – like 
a beast or even like vegetative or inanimate matter. For the lustful sinners stripped of 
reason, the sensual pleasure of touch, shared by all animals, becomes their 
overpowering desire, and in Hell, in keeping with medieval bestiary lore, they are 
consequently compared to birds buffeted by the wind (Inf. V). For the gluttons, 
bodily nourishment necessary also to plant life becomes their overriding desire. In 
Hell, they appear human but in reality they have become indistinguishable from 
beasts and wallow in their own filth like dogs and pigs (Inf. VI). The avaricious make 
material goods, inanimate matter, their goal and become in Hell little better than the 
boulders they must endlessly push around (Inf. VII). Finally, according to the extent 
of their wrath, the sinners in the fifth circle are submerged by degrees in a river of 
blood (Inf. VIII).  
 As Virgil clarifies (XI, 28–33), the seventh circle of violence is divided into 
three rings: violence against one’s neighbour (Inf. XII), against oneself (Inf. XIII), 
and against God (Inf. XIV–XVII). Modern commentators typically trace this triple 
division to Aquinas but, even if this is his source, Dante uses these categories in a 
very different way: for example, the classification ‘sins against the self’ includes, for 
Aquinas, the intemperate sins of gluttony and lust whereas, for Dante, it is restricted 
to wilful self-destruction (suicide or a squandering of one’s own possessions). More 
convincing, in my view, is that these three victims of man’s violence (neighbour, self, 
and God) are connected to the parallel victims of man’s hatred in Virgil’s 
corresponding lecture on the moral structure of Purgatory (Purg. XVII, 104–14). 
Virgil explains there that one cannot hate God directly because God is the necessary 
cause of our existence. One can rebel against God indirectly, however, insofar as our 
disordered will hates God’s effects such as His supremacy or His prohibition of sins. 
In this way, violence against God is possible. Similarly, we cannot hate ourselves 
directly but we can do violence to ourselves. Thus, for example, we may misjudge as 
good in some respect something that is, in fact, evil: the suicide may kill himself in 
order to end misery and suffering. From Virgil’s lecture in Purgatory, therefore, we 
may understand why violence against self (our very existence) and against God (the 
origin of that existence) are – for Dante – not only possible but progressively more 
grave than violence against neighbour (who is outside our existence). Virgil’s 
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threefold division of violence against God into blasphemy (Inf. XIV), sodomy (Inf. 
XV–XVI), and usury (Inf. XVII) in the third ring of violence (a sterile desert battered 
by a rain of fire) requires, however, further comment and, in the narrative, provokes 
Dante-character’s puzzlement (XI, 94–6). Citing Aristotle’s Physics and, for further 
confirmation, the theological authority of Genesis, Virgil argues that Nature takes its 
course from the Divine Intellect, while human work takes its course from Nature. 
Where blasphemy scorns God directly, the sexual act of sodomy (whether between 
two men or between a man and a woman) disdains the principle of fertility in Nature 
and, consequently, indirectly scorns God. Usury – the lending of money at interest – 
scorns Nature because, as Aristotle argued, it is unnatural that money should beget 
money (Politics, I, 10). It also derides human work because the creditor does not add 
value and instead receives something (the interest) for nothing (the original sum of 
money is returned risk free).  
 Virgil allots only a single terzina to the ten species of simple fraud (circle 8): 
‘hypocrisy, flattery, divining, impersonators, theft and simony, panders, barrators, 
and like filth’ (ipocresia, lusinghe e chi affatura, / falsità, ladroneccio e simonia, / 
ruffian, baratti e simile lordura; XI, 58–60). Virgil’s list is in no apparent order, and 
two sins are missed out entirely. Is this accidental? Is it just for convenience of 
versification and rhyme? Does Dante, at this point of writing, not have a clear plan of 
how he will structure Malebolge? Whatever the reason, there is a clear narrative 
effect: the reader must discover those sins unnamed by Virgil – the counsellors of 
fraud (eighth bolgia) and the sowers of scandal and schism (ninth bolgia) – and also 
the respective gravity of the sins enumerated. Moreover, it may be that Dante is more 
concerned to stress the generic effect of simple fraud, which offends against the 
natural bond of love between human beings, than its degrees (and it is noticeable that 
no more detailed rationale is given). In this light, it is striking that half of Dante’s 
Inferno (cantos XVIII–XXXIV) is concerned with the sin of fraud, whether simple 
(circle 8) or treacherous (circle 9). The moral weighting of Inferno arguably reflects 
Dante’s profound concern with the way in which fraud perverts human reason and its 
expression through language. As Barański has demonstrated, Dante succeeds in 
integrating nineteen out of twenty-four of the ‘sins of the tongue’ listed in Peraldus’s 
thirteenth-century preaching manual De vitiis in Malebolge.1 Furthermore, all the sins 
of fraud undermine the very foundations of civil society, as Pietro d’Alighieri’s gloss 
to Inferno XI, 52-60 highlights with its references to Aristotle’s Politics and to 
Justinian’s code, the Corpus Juris Civilis.2 In the last pocket of Malebolge, this is 
emphasized by the punishment of the falsifiers: for their corruption of the ‘body 
politic’ through alchemy, impersonation, counterfeiting (especially of coinage), and 
lying, they must suffer eternally four horrific diseases: leprosy, insanity, dropsy, and 
a raging fever.   
 The social-political dimension of Dante’s moral structure is reinforced in the 
pit of Cocytus (circle 9), where treachery is punished in four sub-circles: Caina (to 
kin), Antenora (to country), Ptolomea (to guests), and Judecca (to lords and 
benefactors). In Dante’s hierarchy, the first loyalty is to one’s lord, the second to 
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guests, the third to country, and the fourth to family. Dante thus considers it worse to 
betray one’s lord than to betray members of one’s own family. This reflects a key 
link between Dante’s ethical theory and his imperial political philosophy. Where the 
Florentine state was soon to celebrate the republican Brutus, Dante audaciously 
counterpoises Brutus and Cassius’s betrayal of Julius Caesar with Judas’s betrayal of 
Christ: the three sinners are endlessly chewed in Satan’s three mouths. Dante 
considers Brutus and Cassius the very worst sinners precisely because, betraying their 
lord, they sought to frustrate the divinely ordained establishment of a universal ruler.  
 Although Virgil’s rationale for the moral structure of Hell delineates the four 
principal regions of Hell that take up thirty of Inferno’s thirty-four cantos, it 
strikingly leaves out Hell’s first section, where the ‘neutrals’ reside, and which lies 
inside the infernal gate but outside the circles of Upper Hell (Inf. III), as well as 
Virgil’s own eternal resting-place, the Limbo of the virtuous pagans within the first 
circle (Inf. IV), and the very area in which Virgil gives his lecture, the sixth circle of 
heresy (Inf. X-XI). In a literal sense, these three categories are theological not 
philosophical, they do not concern moral evil as such, and they are not intelligible in 
pagan or purely rational terms. In an allegorical sense, however, these daringly 
original regions of Dante’s Hell are the exceptions that prove the rule, arguably 
reinforcing the Aristotelian taxonomy underpinning the moral structure of Hell as a 
whole. The neutrals, who pursued neither good nor evil, may correspond to 
Aristotle’s category of the pusillanimous: the river Acheron, on this reading, divides 
sins of omission (Inf. III) from sins of commission (Inf. IV-XXXIV). In the first 
circle of Hell, the exceptional virtue of the pagans may inversely parallel the 
exceptional degree of vice of the treacherous souls in the ninth circle (the pit of 
Cocytus). Aristotle, indeed, counterpoises incontinence with continence, malice with 
virtue, and extreme malice (or bestiality) with a rare superhuman level of virtue. 
Furthermore, where heresy is, conventionally at least, a specifically Christian sin, 
Dante singles out for special treatment the ‘Epicureans’ who are remarkable for their 
political and intellectual prowess, and are punished for denying the immortality of the 
soul rather than for any strictly moral fault.  
  What motivated Dante explicitly to privilege Aristotle as his primary ethical 
authority in Hell (in Inferno XI, Virgil directly cites Aristotle’s Ethics (80), his 
Physics (101) and, arguably, his Metaphysics (97) within just twenty-two lines)? 
After all, as Alison Morgan has shown, most of the sins punished in Dante’s Hell are 
found in popular Christian visions of the other world, or are listed in twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century confession manuals.3 In major part, the cause was Dante’s 
polemical ethical-political programme. Dante believed that the pagan Aristotle had 
given a comprehensive account of secular ethics, and this justified his insistence that 
philosophical principles were sufficient to guide humans to this-worldly felicity and 
to provide the basis for law in the political sphere. But why, in that case, did Dante 
choose Virgil, the poet of Roman Empire (Inf. I, 73–4), and not Aristotle, ‘the master 
of them that know’ (’l maestro di color che sanno; Inf. IV, 131), as his moral guide? 
In the Convivio, Dante argues that, while imperial power without ethics is dangerous, 
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ethics without political power is weak (IV, vi, 17). In Purgatorio VI, Dante bemoans 
the empty seat of empire: what use are laws if there is no one to enforce them (88–
90)? Dante believed – against apologists for papal temporal power – that only a 
restoration of the Holy Roman Empire could lead to the establishment of moral order 
and therefore peace on earth. Arguably, then, one purpose of Dante’s Inferno is to 
represent in the afterlife the moral justice which, in the absence of an Emperor, Dante 





In the penultimate canto of Purgatorio, Beatrice glosses an allegorical representation 
of the Church’s moral corruption (XXXII, 100–60). The final vision of the ‘whore’ 
(puttana; 149 and 160) almost certainly refers to the papacy of Boniface VIII (1294–
1303), while the detachment of the sacred chariot from the tree represents the 
transference of the papacy from Rome to Avignon in 1309. In opposition to a 
decadent Church in Babylonian captivity, Dante’s Purgatorio presents a moral vision 
of the Church fulfilling its true divine mandate to lead sinners back to God. Dante 
draws on two important developments in the Church’s ongoing reform. In response to 
a renewed emphasis on the practice of confession at the Fourth Lateran Council 
(1215–16), theologians mined the tradition of the seven capital vices as a convenient 
scheme for Christian ethical formation. As the doctrine of Purgatory gained more 
prominence in the life of the Church (it was only given the official stamp at the 
Second Council of Lyon in 1274), preachers sought to explain purgatorial suffering 
as, in part, an extension of earthly penance. In depicting the seven terraces of 
Purgatory (Purg. IX–XXVII), Dante thus fused this popular material on the seven 
capital vices with the emerging connection between earthly penance and purgatorial 
suffering. Dante’s Purgatory is ‘where the human spirit is purged and becomes fit to 
ascend to Heaven’ (dove l’umano spirito si purga / e di salire al ciel diventa degno; 
Purg. I, 5–6). 
 There are, then, four key differences between infernal and purgatorial 
suffering. First, whereas Hell punishes sins or evil actions, Purgatory purifies vices or 
evil habits. The seven capital vices are ‘seven springs’ from which ‘all the deadly 
corruptions of souls emanate’.4 Second, whereas corporeal suffering is unredemptive 
in Hell, it has a twofold purpose in Purgatory: according to its intensity, it punishes a 
sinner’s guilt and, according to its duration, it corrects a sinner’s vicious dispositions. 
Third, although all souls not in Paradise experience the lack of the divine vision 
(poena damni), this deprivation is perpetual in Hell but only temporary in Purgatory. 
Fourth, whereas evil is punished principally in accordance with natural ethics in Hell, 
the completely different moral order of Christian holiness emerges in Purgatory: 
‘here they make themselves holy again’ (qui si rifà santa; Purg. XXIII, 66). Dante’s 
treatment of wrath, avarice, gluttony, and lust is essentially different, therefore, in 
Hell and in Purgatory. For example, gluttony is punished in Hell as the failure of 
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reason to moderate the appetite. By contrast, on the mountain of Purgatory (at the 
exact antipodes of Jerusalem, the place of Christ’s crucifixion), the gluttonous souls’ 
extreme fasting – their faces become dark, hollow, and wasted, and their eye sockets 
like rings without gems (22–33) – leads to spiritual union with Christ (70–5).  
 The moral structure of Purgatory is only articulated in the central terrace of 
Purgatory (Purg. XVII), and at the centre of the poem as a whole. Dante-character 
and Virgil arrive at the fourth terrace of sloth at nightfall and, as the mountain cannot 
be climbed without the light of the sun (symbolically without the grace of God), they 
are forced to wait. As in the corresponding episode in Inferno XI, Virgil makes the 
time profitable by explaining the region’s moral structure. Its foundation is the 
universal relationship of love between the Creator and His creation: ‘Neither Creator 
nor creature […], my son, was ever without love’ (Né creator né creatura mai [...] 
figliuol, fu sanza amore; XVII, 91–2). Virgil distinguishes, however, between two 
principal kinds of love: natural love and love of the mind (‘naturale o d’animo’; 93). 
Natural love is shared throughout the order of creation: it is the love that makes any 
material body fall to the earth, fire to ascend, a plant to grow, or an animal to move 
towards food. As it is determined, this natural love is always without error. By 
contrast, rational love (‘d’animo’), which specifies humans as ‘rational animals’, is 
subject to free will. As elective, this rational love may err, and such disorder is vice. 
For this reason, love is not only the seed of every human virtue, but also of every 
human action that deserves punishment (XVIII, 103–5). The function of Christian 
ethics, then, is the reordering of human love. As Augustine emphasizes, ‘a brief and 
true definition of virtue is “rightly ordered love”. That is why, in the holy Song of 
Songs, Christ’s bride, the City of God, sings, “Set charity in order in me” ’ (De civ. 
Dei, XV, 22). Everything must be loved, including the self, insofar as it is ordered to 
God.  
 To describe this disordered love in terms of the seven capital vices, Dante 
adopts the moral framework provided by the Dominican friar William Peraldus in his 
treaties on the vices (De vitiis).5 Dante divides disordered love into two main 
categories: love of an evil and perverted love of a good through excess or deficiency 
(XVII, 94–6). The evil loved must be directed against one’s neighbour (106–14), as 
humans necessarily love their own existence and God as the cause of that existence. 
Dante defines pride, envy, and anger, therefore, as different ways by which we may 
hate our neighbour. The proud hope for excellence through the humiliation of others 
(115–7). The envious fear to lose their power, honour, or fame through the success of 
others, and thus desire that others be brought low (118–20). The angry, because of 
some injury, are desirous of revenge and are ready, therefore, to harm their neighbour 
(121–3). What, then, about the disordered love of the good? The unmeasured love by 
deficiency (‘per poco di vigore’; 96) is the quiddity of sloth: the distinctive failure 
sufficiently to love God, the greatest good. Unmeasured love by excess (‘per troppo 
[...] di vigore’; 96) is the genus of the three final vices of avarice, gluttony, and lust 
(136–9).   
 Virgil’s doctrinal lecture may be represented poetically through the figure of the 
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siren that appears in the pilgrim’s second dream on the mountain (XIX, 1–33). As the 
opening metaphor of the canticle highlights (I, 1–2), our life is a sea-journey to God. 
The first triad of vices – pride, envy, and anger – concern internal spiritual blindness 
that sets us off on the wrong course leading to hatred of neighbour. This internal 
blindness is corrected on the three corresponding terraces: proud eyes are bent low, 
envious eyes stitched up, wrathful eyes plunged into impenetrable darkness. The 
second triad of vices concerns the disordered attraction towards external sensible 
things: the avaricious seek to possess all they see; the gluttons are possessed by the 
taste of foods and drinks; the lustful by the touch of sexual pleasure. Given where she 
appears, the siren arguably embodies a transition from the internal to the external 
triads of vices: she does not just distract the wayfarer from his true course and entice 
him to slow his oar (the specific vice of sloth), she seduces him to follow unworthy 
worldly cares and distractions. Indeed, in classical illustrations of the siren, her closed 
arms depict avarice; her fish’s tail, gluttony; her virginal face, lust. 
 Dante only uses the noun ‘Purgatorio’ (VII, 39; IX, 49) to refer to the seven 
terraces of the mountain (Purg. X–XXVII), and Virgil’s lecture just explains the 
moral structure of this region. As with his corresponding lecture on Hell, Virgil 
leaves out what are arguably the most theologically original parts of the canticle in 
terms of moral structure: an antechamber conventionally named Ante-Purgatory that 
stretches from the shore up a rock face to Purgatory’s gateway (Purg. I–VIII), and the 
Earthly Paradise at the summit of the mountain (Purg. XXVIII–XXXIII). Dante 
condemns five groups of souls to Ante-Purgatory: the spiritually tardy (who must 
wait at the mouth of the river Tiber for their ferry crossing to the shores of 
Purgatory), the excommunicates (Purg. III), the lazy who delayed repentance (Purg. 
IV), those who repented at the last minute, even at point of death (Purg. V–VI), and 
negligent rulers (Purg. VII–VIII). According to a novel kind of contrapasso, the 
souls in Ante-Purgatory – deprived temporarily of the purifying pain of sense (poena 
sensus) – are forced to experience exclusively the lack of the divine vision (poena 
damni). There is, in this way, a direct correlation between the souls in Ante-Purgatory 
and those in Limbo (who also do not suffer the poena sensus). There is also a key 
difference. The poena damni of the souls in Limbo is eternal: they ‘live without hope 
in desire’ (che sanza speme vivemo in disio; Inf. IV, 42), whereas the poena damni of 
the souls in Ante-Purgatory is temporary: they live, with hope, in desire for the 
beatific vision. And it is this hope that makes their waiting – for the excommunicates, 
thirty times the period of their contumacy; for the rest, the period equal to the 
duration of their earthly lives – bearable.   
 The emphasis in Ante-Purgatory on those who have delayed their penitence on 
earth and thus must wait, as a punishment for delaying, for the purifying pain of sense 
(poena corrigentis) highlights that Purgatory continues a moral process that should 
have started in this life. Ante-Purgatory is framed by the appearance of four stars 
symbolizing the cardinal virtues and three stars symbolizing the theological virtues 
that rise in their place (I, 22–7; VIII, 85–93). The region is characterized by a 
powerful nostalgia for the world left behind and, on reaching Purgatory, Dante-
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character is warned by the gate-keeper that ‘whoever looks back must return outside’ 
(di fuor torna chi ’n dietro si guata; IX, 132). In Augustinian terms, Christians must 
be in but not of this world: they are pilgrims (peregrin; II, 63) moving through a 
temporary dwelling place on their way to their true home, the celestial city (De 
doctrina Christiana, I, 4). In a thinly-veiled allegory at the door of Purgatory (IX, 
70–145), Dante-character undergoes the sacrament of penance and, on absolution, 
enters Purgatory to begin his satisfaction for his sins that are ritually marked as seven 
Ps (peccata) on his forehead. Through the seven terraces of Purgatory, Dante-
character is purged of the seven sins and the seven Ps are miraculously erased. 
 The first terrace is of pride, the worst of the seven sins in the order established 
by St Gregory the Great. Pride and envy are both vices associated with the intellect 
and are graver, and thus lower on the mountain, than wrath and sloth (associated with 
the irascible appetite) and avarice, gluttony and lust (associated with the 
concupiscible appetite). The seven sins are, moreover, causally connected: thus pride 
begets envy as, in seeking an empty renown, the soul feels envy towards someone 
able to obtain it; the last vice, lust, may be caused by gluttony as the inordinate 
consumption of food may dispose the soul to sexual wantonness. Dante draws out 
different aspects of a given vice establishing, for example, a threefold division of 
pride in relation to time: Omberto Aldobrandeschi took pride in his ancestors (XI, 
58–72); Provenzan Salvani in his present political power (109–42), and Oderisi in his 
future artistic fame (82–108). In keeping with popular tradition, Dante pairs each of 
the seven capital vices with one remedial virtue: thus pride with humility (Purg. X–
XII), envy with charity (XIII–XV), wrath with gentleness (XV–XVII), sloth with zeal 
(XVII–XIX), avarice with poverty (XIX–XXII), gluttony with abstinence (XXII–
XXV), and lust with chastity (XXV–XVII). These abstract vices and virtues are 
embodied in the vicious and virtuous actions of particular individuals in episodes 
taken from the Bible, from pagan myth, and from history. The narrative exempla are 
presented in contrasting ways from sculptured reliefs (humility and pride) and 
ecstatic visions (gentleness and wrath) to disembodied voices (envy and charity). The 
Virgin Mary occupies the most important role as the model par excellence of the path 
to Christian virtue, and prayerful meditation upon her life is presented as a remedy 
for the wounds of sin. The souls in Purgatory are also orientated to God through 
passages of Scripture, the beatitudes, liturgy, and major Christian prayers.  
 Where the pains of Purgatory as a whole were conventionally depicted as a 
refining fire, Dante specifically reserves fire for the seventh terrace. This has two 
advantages. First, Dante effectively evokes through fire the intense burning of sexual 
desire, whether natural (heterosexual), but potentially bordering on the bestial, or 
against nature (same-sex). Second, Dante brings together the final suffering of 
Purgatory with ‘the fiery revolving sword’ which guarded Eden after the Fall (Gen. 
3:24) equating, thereby, the restoration of grace after ritual purgation with the 
recovery of a restored Earthly Paradise. However, Dante’s syncretism is even more 
daring as he explicitly identifies Eden with ‘the golden age and its happy state’ 
dreamed by the pagan poets (l’età de l’oro e suo stato felice; XXVIII, 139–41). 
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Strikingly, it is at this stage that Virgil nonetheless departs the scene. As is clear from 
the encounter with Statius (Purg. XXI–XXII), Dante conventionally believed that 
Virgil’s fourth eclogue had prophesized Christ without the poet’s awareness, so that 
Virgil himself had not benefitted from its miraculous intuition. Although Virgil 
crowns Dante-character at Purgatory’s summit with a will which is free, upright, and 
healthy (XXVII, 124–42), his role of guide is overtaken in Eden, first by Matelda and 
then, after a procession which allegorizes God’s revelation through the books of the 
Bible, by Beatrice. The moral climax of Purgatorio is Dante-character’s encounter 
with Beatrice, who is circled by handmaidens representing the three theological and 
four cardinal virtues. The pilgrim is forced to confess his sin in turning from her 
before having the memory of his sins washed away in the river Lethe and his good 
memories restored in the river Eünoè. Only then, and in the last line of Purgatorio, is 
the pilgrim finally ‘pure and made ready to rise to the stars’ (puro e disposto a salire a 





With Inferno and Purgatorio, Dante combines moral schemes within invented 
topographies: the subterranean funnel of Hell in the northern hemisphere and the 
seven terraces of Mount Purgatory in the southern hemisphere. With Paradiso, by 
contrast, Dante starts with the actual universe as perceived in early fourteenth-century 
Ptolemaic astronomy: the seven planetary spheres, the eighth sphere of the fixed 
starts, the primum mobile, and the Empyrean. Dante informs us, however, that the 
souls in Paradise actually reside only in the Empyrean, the highest of the ten regions 
described. The blessed souls appear in the other celestial spheres just for Dante-
character’s benefit: in order to signify to him their different grades of beatitude (Par. 
IV, 28–39). As Scripture condescends to human faculties in attributing feet and hands 
to God, but means otherwise, so the blessed souls thereby condescend to Dante-
character’s human mode of knowing: from sense perception to intellectual cognition 
(IV, 40–8). There is in Dante’s Paradiso, then, a clear distinction between what 
Paradise is (the ontological status of the blessed souls in the Empyrean) and how 
Paradise is conveyed (the illustrative appearance of the blessed souls and the angels 
in the nine celestial spheres). This distinction seems particularly appropriate to 
Paradiso, with Dante’s insistent emphases on the limits of the human mind to 
comprehend divine realities and the even more limited capacity of human language to 
express them.  
 The simultaneous unity and diversity of the blessed souls – sharing the beatific 
vision but in different degrees – raises, however, a pressing theological question: how 
are degrees of beatitude compatible with the perfection of Paradise? Notably, the 
blessed soul to whom Dante-character addresses this question is Piccarda Donati. In 
Purgatory, Dante-character had asked her brother, Forese, ‘where is Piccarda?’ (dov’è 
Piccarda; Purg. XXIV, 10), only to be informed that she ‘triumphs joyous with her 
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crown on high Olympus’ (trïumfa lieta / ne l’alto Olimpo già di sua corona; 14–15). 
In the same encounter, Forese had prophesized the death and damnation of their 
brother, Corso, whom he foresees dragged ‘towards the valley where guilt is never 
forgiven’ (inver’ la valle ove mai non si scolpa; 84). The hierarchy of Paradise is thus 
related to the central issue of divine justice in Dante’s moral vision as a whole. 
Infernal pain, purgatorial suffering, and paradisiacal bliss are of different degrees in 
the afterlife because human beings are not equal in merit or fault on earth. But, as 
Piccarda explains, a lower degree of bliss in Heaven does not imply a lack of 
perfection because God’s favour is proportionate to a particular individual’s capacity 
to receive it. Repeating the word ‘more’ (più) thrice in two lines (Par. III, 65–6), 
Dante-character asks Piccarda, the ‘least’ of the blessed, if she desires a higher place. 
Smiling ‘a little’ (un poco; 67), Piccarda explains that were she to desire ‘more’ (più; 
73) her will would be discordant with God’s will: to be in God’s will is the peace of 
Paradise (64–87). The pilgrim understands, thereby, both that everywhere in Heaven 
is Paradise and that the grace of the highest good does not rain there in equal measure 
(88–90). 
 How, then, does Dante structure the celestial spheres to represent these 
different degrees of beatitude? In the Convivio, Dante had already used the Ptolemaic 
heavens to project his idea of the system of knowledge (II, xiii, 2–20), playfully 
connecting each discipline with a heaven by a shared characteristic: for example, the 
ninth sphere of the primum mobile, which sets the eight lower celestial spheres 
spinning in their diurnal rotation, is like ethics, which orders our learning of all the 
other branches of knowledge (14–18). For Paradiso, however, Dante rejects any 
straightforward analogy of this kind. Instead, alongside any symbolic significance, he 
insists upon the material effect of each of the heavenly spheres on the sublunar world. 
The discourses on free will at the centre of Purgatorio clarify that, for Dante, only the 
human intellect, as non-material, is free from astral influence (XVI, 67–130; XVIII, 
49–75). All the human bodily organs and faculties including imagination, judgement, 
personality, and artistic gifts are influenced by the seven planetary heavens, an 
influence Dante considered to be more powerful than heredity.  
 As Charles Martel highlights (Par. VIII, 94–148), it is through these astral 
influences that Providence brings about the diversity in natural gifts necessary for 
society. Ascending through the seven planetary heavens, Dante encounters groups of 
souls, therefore, whose lives and missions were directly informed by the particular 
influences of the planetary sphere in which they appear. When we find lovers in the 
sphere of Venus, this is because Dante believed that the planet literally moved or 
disposed people under its influence to love. It is equally true, nonetheless, that the 
seven planetary heavens would have suggested to Dante the ethical schemes of the 
seven remedial virtues or the three theological and four cardinal virtues. As we have 
seen, the former scheme is adopted in the seven terraces of Purgatory, while the latter 
is anticipated by the stars in Ante-Purgatory and Beatrice’s handmaidens in Eden. For 
his vision of Paradise, the poet overlaps the scheme of the cardinal and theological 
virtues with the idea of astral influence on personality.  
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 As the sun is the fourth planet orbiting the earth in geocentric astronomy, it 
was believed that the earth’s shadow partly obscured the first three planets. Dante 
uses this ‘shadowed’ aspect of the heavens of the Moon (Par. II–V), Mercury (V–
VII), and Venus (VIII–IX) to represent the three theological virtues – faith, hope, and 
love – tainted by earthly concerns. The equation between faith and the inconstant in 
vows (Moon), between hope and the glorious in earthly fame (Mercury), and between 
charity and the earthly lovers (Venus) is, however, no more than implicit. In fact, 
some scholars have interpreted these spheres in terms respectively of imperfect 
fortitude, justice, and temperance. Both interpretations are plausible. Piccarda was 
inconstant in her vow when seized from her cloister unlike, she says, St Clare of 
Assisi who persisted in her pledge of consecration despite threats (III, 98–9). Not 
holding to her vow even unto martyrdom, Piccarda thereby lacked both faith and 
fortitude. Justinian pursued justice on earth and consequently is presented as the ideal 
of the emperor-ruler. Yet he was overly motivated by the hope of earthly fame rather 
than by hope of eternal glory. Cunizza was compassionate in later life, and yet 
infamous for her serial lovers and marriages. Her love was intemperate and fell short 
of the perfect love of charity.  
 There is little doubt about the relationship between the next four planetary 
spheres and the four cardinal virtues. Prudence is clearly associated with the Christian 
intellectuals in the heaven of the Sun (Par. X–XIV), fortitude with the Christian 
crusader-martyrs in the heaven of Mars (XIV–XVII), justice with the just in the 
heaven of Jupiter (XVIII–XX), and temperance with the contemplatives in the heaven 
of Saturn (XXI–XXII). Yet, the scheme of the cardinal virtues is still subordinated to 
the primary consideration of astral influence. Thus, following Aquinas, it might have 
been more natural for Dante to pair prudence with temperance and justice with 
fortitude, as we need temperance to follow what prudence counsels, and fortitude to 
fulfil the social demands of justice. But Dante pairs prudence with fortitude and 
justice with temperance, and this is because – in terms of planetary influence – the 
human disposition to temperance is associated with the cold planet Saturn, while the 
virtue of fortitude is associated with the fiery planet Mars. Beyond the seven 
planetary spheres (II–XXII), the theological virtues reappear in the eighth heaven of 
the fixed stars, where saints Peter, James, and John become the shining exempla of 
faith, hope, and charity (XXIII–XXVII), and Dante-character is examined by them on 
each of these virtues in turn.  
 Although it is possible to draw out the moral structure of Dante’s Paradise in 
this way, there is no parallel in the canticle to Virgil’s lessons on the moral order of 
Hell and Purgatory. There is, however, a backward glance at the seven planetary 
spheres in Paradiso XXII, 133–5 and 151. This detached, contemplative perspective 
on the world (in the tradition of the contemptus mundi) is ethically significant, 
because it is exactly what Dante believed was lacking in his own time, and 
particularly so in the Roman Church. The origins of the papacy in St Peter, of western 
monasticism in St Benedict, and of the mendicant orders in St Francis were all 
characterized by material poverty (88–93). But, where the Church Fathers searched 
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for God, the slothful modern prelates desire only riches and worldly power: they have 
taken Cupidity not Poverty as their wife (Ep. XI. 14–6), and their ‘avarice afflicts the 
world, trampling the good and raising up the wicked’ (la vostra avarizia il mondo 
attrista, / calcando i buoni e sollevando i pravi; Inf. XIX, 104). Dante’s condemnation 
of the contemporary papacy reaches its climax in Peter’s denunciation of his current 
successors: in the eyes of the Son of God, the seat of the papacy is vacant, and his 
burial place has become a sewer (Par. XXVII, 22–7). 
 An overarching moral theme of Dante’s Paradiso, then, is Christian asceticism 
and the Church’s true mission to lead people to God. In the first, fourth, and seventh 
of the planetary spheres, Dante places especial emphasis on religious orders and the 
religious life. Piccarda and Costanza were Franciscan nuns, ‘Poor Clares’, before 
being violently abducted from their cloister. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure praise 
the founders of each other’s orders, St Dominic and St Francis, while denouncing the 
subsequent degeneracy of their own. St Benedict, the founder of western monastic 
orders, and St Peter Damian, a rigorous reformer, extol the ascetic contemplative life. 
Alongside a moral critique of the contemporary Church, Dante’s Paradiso also 
provides an ideal model for the Empire and its relationship to the Church. In the 
second sphere of Mercury, Dante upholds Justinian as an exemplary emperor who 
reformed the civil law, he locates the corruption of the papacy in the donation of 
Constantine, and he lauds pope Agapetus’s spiritual counsel of Justinian. In the sixth 
sphere of Jupiter, the dramatic appearance of Ripheus and Trajan in the eye of the 
eagle highlights Dante’s belief in the providential role of the Roman Empire to 
administer justice. The heaven of Mars, moreover, celebrates the cooperation of the 
pope and emperor in the liberation of the Holy Lands through the crusades, with 
Dante presenting his ancestor Cacciaguida as a de facto Christian martyr. The 
glorious lives of the souls in Dante’s Paradise not only illustrate particular aspects of 
virtue, therefore, but also provide models for the two institutions of Church and 
Empire, the ‘the two suns’ that, for Dante, should make visible ‘the two paths, of the 
world and of God’ (due soli […], che l’una e l’altra strada / facean vedere, e del 
mondo e di Deo; Purg. XVI, 107-8).    
 
 
Given the sophisticated organization of evil in Hell, the school of ordered and 
disordered love in Purgatory, and the joyful celebration of human talents and virtues 
in Paradise, it is easy to lose sight of the binary division in Dante’s moral universe 
which, from a Christian point of view, is the sole one that ultimately matters, namely, 
the division between those who are able and freely will to submit themselves to 
God’s infinite love and mercy and those who, wilfully or not, are closed to God’s 
love. The first category includes all those in Paradise and in Purgatory. The second 
category comprises all those in Hell. The primary condition of souls in Hell, after all, 
is not only the lack of the beatific vision but, crucially, the lack of any hope that they 
may ever attain it: on entering Hell’s gate, they leave all hope behind (Inf. III, 9). In 
Purgatory, the souls are joyful – even in suffering – because of their living hope for 
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the beatific vision. In Paradise, they enjoy this vision: ‘light intellectual full of love, 
love of true good full of joy, joy that surpasses every sweetness’ (luce intelletüal, 
piena d’amore; / amore di vero ben, pien di letizia; / letizia che trascende ogne 
dolzore; Par. XXX, 40–2).  
 This ultimate division between the damned and the saved strongly reaffirms the 
moral urgency of Dante’s poem, written ‘for the good of the world that lives badly’ 
(in pro del mondo che mal vive; Purg. XXXII, 103), for those who live and, while 
alive, still have hope. As Manfred beautifully articulates in Ante-Purgatory, ‘none is 
so lost that the eternal love cannot return while hope keeps any of it green’ (non si 
perde / che non possa tornar l’etterno Amore, / mentre che la speranza ha fior del 
verde; III, 133–5). The poem’s most powerful moral message, then, is God’s love for 
those who turn to Him. As Manfred, smiling, confesses: ‘Horrible were my sins, but 
the infinite goodness has arms so wide that it receives whoever turns to it’ (Orribil 
furon li peccati miei; / ma la Bontà infinita ha sì gran braccia, / che prende ciò che si 
rivolge a lei; 121–3). Union with God is the fulfilment of all human desires as 
Piccarda, the first soul encountered in Paradise, explains: ‘And in His will is our 
peace’ (E ’n la sua volontade è nostra pace; Par. III, 85–7).  
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